Patanjali's yoga sutras

तदर्थ एव दृश्यस्यात्मा ॥ २.२१ ॥

tadartha eva dṛśyasyātmā || 2.21 ||

Its purpose is simply to see the true nature of the spectacle.

https://www.wisdomlib.org/definition/tadartha

Yoga Sutras 2.21

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तदर्थ एव दृश्यस्यात्मा

Tadartha eva dṛśyasyātmā

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Tat, this; artha, purpose; eva, only; dṛśyasyā, of the knowable; atmā, existence

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The nature of the seen is exclusively for the sake of seer.

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Seen, buddhi, manas and rest of the prakrti, exists only for the sake of the purusa. Meaning of the seen, which is this material world, is to provide either experience (bhoga) or freedom (mukti) from the cycle of birth and death. Purusa is the experiencer and prakrti is experienced. When liberation (mukti) is achieved purusa is diconnected (kaivalya) from the control of the prakrti.

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The True Self is the Seer,

observing all that can be known

and all that remains unknowable …

the visible and invisible worlds. These realms exist for the joy

and by the grace of the Seer.

-Alberto Villoldo

“Spectacle” (dṛśya) has been defined above (II, XVIII). ‘Its soul’ (ātmā) is its true nature. It, “the soul of the spectacle,” is required for “his purpose,” for the purpose of consummating the experiencership of soul to the exclusion of all selfish ends. Pradhāna in activity does not work with a view to attain any aim of its own, but to accomplish the experiencership of soul.

Notes and Extracts

[Notes and comparative extracts from other commentaries on the Yogasūtra]

[The meaning is that the true nature of the spectacle acts solely to accomplish the purpose of soul, and not for any purpose of its own, for it has none such. It will be noticed that the text says it is the soul of the spectacle, and not the spectacle itself, that subserves the purpose of soul, and the question arises what is its soul? The word used in the text is ātmā, which means soul, i.e., the soul of the spectacle subserves the purpose of the soul of a living being. The commentator explains ātmā by svarūpa “it own natural form,” or true nature. In the commentary on A, XIX, he uses the words svarūpābhinnaḥ parīṇāmaḥ, or “a modification not different from its primary form,” neither of which carriesus directly to what is meant. It is obvious, however, from the use of the word Pradhāna—Prakṛti in the commentary on the aphorism under notice, which in activity, is said, “not to work with a view to attain any aim of its own,” that the “soul of the spectacle” is but another form of expression for Prakṛti. That Prakṛti [n][?] activity is the spectacle is abundantly evident in the leading works of the Sāṅkhya system. Thus, in the Sāṅkhya-kārikā: “For the sake of soul’s wish, that subtile person exhibits (before it) like a dramatic actor, through relation of means and consequence, with the aid of nature’s influence.” (Verse XLII). Again,“as & dancer, having exhibited herself to the spectator, desists from the dance, so does nature desist, having manifested herself to soul.” (Verse LIX). Again: “Generous nature, endued with qualities, does by manifold means accomplish, without benefit (to herself), the wish of the ungrateful soul, devoid as he is of qualities.” (Verse LX). Again “he desists because he has seen her; she does so, because she has been seen. In their (mere) union there is no motive for creation.” (Verse LXVI). Similarly the Sāṅkhya Sūtra: “Nature’s creating is for the sake of another, though it be spontaneous,—for she is not the experiencer,—just like a cart carrying saffron (for the sake of its master).” (Ballantyne, III, lviii). Again, “just like a dancer, does she, though she had been energising, desist, because of the end having been attained (in the shape of soul’s aim).” (Ibid. III, lix). Nor is there any inconsistency in this, for intellect does not differ from Prakṛti except in being in activity; and “soul,” “true nature,” “original shape of the intellect,” and other similar expressions must imply Prakṛti or nature, and nothing else. This will explain the remarks made in the note on Aphorisms XVII and XIX.

Commenting on the passages quoted from the Sāṅkhya-kārikā, Mr. Davies observes,

“Beautiful as poetry, but not veryphilosophic, nor in direct harmony with other parts of the Sāṅkhya philosophy. Kapila, or Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, forgets that nature (Prakṛti) has no personality, no powers, no volition, and no consciousness,” (p. 95.)

This is not fair towards Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, who provides for such criticism by saying, “as the production of milk, which is unintelligent (unknowing), causes the growth of the calf, so the developement of nature causes the liberation of soul;” (Verse LIX;) and Kapila cites the unintelligent cart carrying saffron for its owner.]

If the accomplishment of the experience of soul be thus the only aim, then, on the accomplishment of that object, Prakṛti, having no other object in view, should cease to be active, and the cessation of all modification in it, itself being pure, (i.e., having the three qualities in equipose) all spectators should be free, and it would follow that the world would be cut short.